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We investigated the effect of forensic accounting on corporate fraud and performance outcome in the Nigerian 
manufacturing sector. Using a match sample of 306 manufacturing firms registered with the Manufacturing 
Association of Nigeria (MAN). 3 hypotheses proposed and tested and the findings revealed that corporate fraud 
is on the increase in this sector of the economy, and the reason is that most managers want to be independent at 
the expense of their employers. That most managers incorporate firms that supply goods to their company at 
very high prices thereby increasing cost of production.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Investment decisions are long-run decisions where consumption and investment alternatives are balanced over 
time in the hope that investment now will generate extra returns in the future (Lucey 2003). Maximizing 
opportunities is the ability to make the best use of the discovered opportunity (meaning you have to discover an 
opportunity before you can maximize it). It involves taking advantage to high capacity the available opportunity 
by judiciously taking necessary step for the usage of the opportunity. Many opportunities have been discovered 
but are yet to be fully maximized.  
The past decade has shown an increased emphasis on internal corporate governance to monitor and implement 
controls over management’s financial reporting decisions (Achambeault, DeZoort, and Holt 2008). For example, 
the New York Stock Exchange now requires that all of its listing companies maintain an internal audit function 
(NYSE 2004). A major objective of the internal auditing function is to help ensure reliable financial reporting 
(Mercer 2004; Bariff 2003) and to review and provide input on management’s estimates and assertions in the 
financial statements (KPMG 2003). Prior research suggests that internal auditors are at least somewhat 
successful at constraining earnings management (Prawitt, Smith, and Wood 2009) and financial reporting fraud 
(Beasley et al. 2000). This study examines task factors at the organizational level that may determine how 
successful internal auditors are at influencing management’s accounting estimates towards forestalling fraud in 
the system.  
Prior research also suggests that oversight of management’s financial reporting decisions can be friendly or turn 
contentious ( McCracken et al, 2008; Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007), and interpersonal relationships vary 
substantially within an organization (Kida et al, 2001; Moreno et al  2002). Internal auditors’ ability to influence 
management may depend not only on the strength of the accounting data supporting their preferred positions, but 
also on how they present that data and how they present themselves to managers. A better understanding of how 
these factors interact can help internal auditors adjust their interactions with management to better achieve their 
corporate governance objectives.  
In practice, internal auditors attempting to influence managers could state their preferred position and either 
present supportive accounting information “raw” (i.e., letting the data speak for itself) or format it into an 
argument. Managers were randomly assigned to experimental conditions in which the internal auditor is 
interpersonally likable or dislikable, and presents accounting information that is either more or less supportive of 
obsolescence, either in an argument format or in a randomized list of the same statements about inventory. 
However, recent fraud scandals involving highly known corporations like Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Global 
Crossing, Parmalat, Lucent, Tyco and Xerox, Cadbury Nigeria Limited, Allstates Trust Bank Nigeria Limited 
etc, have led to restatement and bankruptcies that have harmed several stakeholders. According to Rezzae et al 
(2004) fraudulent reporting has generated losses of more than 500 billion to investors in the last ten years. Thus, 
it has resulted in a financial statement’s credibility loss, raising questions about its integrity. At the same time, 
fraud scandals have eroded the public confidence in the auditing process (Rezzae et al, 2004). 
Despite the difficulty in fighting financial statement fraud, auditors should not ignore this issue. Instead, it is 
necessary to find mechanisms to combat fraudulent acts (Turner, 1999). At the same time, information 
technology is dramatically changing the way financial statements are prepared, audited and used (Zhao et al 
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2004). In this line of thinking, Flowerday and Von Solms (2005) suggest that auditors must find new ways to 
verify financial reports. In this sense, auditors and accounting scholars have been working in the development of 
mechanisms and technologies to audit financial statements and prevent fraud. Thus the aim of this study is to 
find out the impact of forensic accounting on corporate fraud in the Nigerian manufacturing sector 
Considered by the AICPA - American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, one of the emerging 
technologies that will impact Certified Public Accountants’ (CPA) firms, continuous auditing (CA) apparently 
could help to detect misstatements and frauds in financial reporting. In comparison with tradition financial 
statement audit, continuous auditing is more timely, comprehensive, accurate and less costly (Alles et al 2005). 
It refers to the audit of an accounting moving picture instead of the old accounting snapshot (Yang, 1990) 
 
THEORITICAL BACKGROUND 
Nobody has money to throw in the garbage. Thus, the expectation of every investor is Return on Investment 
(ROI). With the theory of separation of ownership from management, it is expected that professional managers 
who are considered more competent than the owners are employed to run and manage the affairs of the company.  
Reported financial scandals (e.g., Allstates Trust Bank in Nigeria, Cadbury Nigeria Limited-Nigeria, Enron, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Qwest, Parmalat) have eroded investors’ confidence and made forensic accounting 
an attractive career opportunity for accountants to combat fraud.  
Several scholars have come with various definition of the term ‘Forensic Accounting’. According to Rezaee et al 
2004, Forensic accounting is defined in this study as the practice of rigorous data collection and analysis in the 
areas of litigation support consulting, expert witnessing, and fraud examination. According to Journal of forensic 
Accounting, forensic accounting is sufficiently thorough and complete so that an accountant, in his considered 
independent professional judgment, can deliver a finding as to accounts, inventories, or the presentation thereof 
that is of such quality that it would be sustainable in some adversarial legal proceeding, or within some judicial 
or administrative review” According to Williams (2002), forensic accounting is recognized as a particular form 
of professional expertise and endowed with specific attributes. The recognition, is ascertained by possessing a 
formal certification in forensic accounting which provides symbolic value. 
The AICPA defines forensic accounting as services that involve “the application of specialized knowledge and 
investigative skills possessed by CPAs”. Forensic accounting services utilize the practitioner’s specialized 
accounting, auditing, economic, tax, and other skills (AICPA 2010). Contributing to the definition of forensic 
accounting, Singleton and Singleton (2010), posit that forensic accounting is the comprehensive view of fraud 
investigation. It includes preventing frauds and analyzing antifraud controls It also includes the gathering of 
nonfinancial information. Crumbley et al (2009) distinguish forensic accounting from fraud auditing. A fraud 
auditor is an accountant especially skilled in auditing…A forensic accountant may take on fraud auditing 
engagements and may in fact be a fraud auditor, but he or she will also use other accounting, consulting, and 
legal skills in broader engagements. Stanbury and Paley-Menzies (2010) state that forensic accounting is, the 
science of gathering and presenting information in a form that will be accepted by a court of jurisprudence 
against perpetrators of economic crime. Hopwood et al (2008) defined forensic accounting as “the application of 
investigative and analytical skills for the purpose of resolving financial issues in a manner that meets standards 
required by courts of law”. Thus, forensic accounting includes no explicit reference to fraud, although fraud 
investigations are a part of forensic accounting. 
As can be seen from this sample of definitions, not only do they vary, but in cases are contradictory, especially 
as it pertains to the inclusion of fraud. In his own contribution Crumbley (2009), asserted that, term forensic 
accounting applies to evaluating accounting information without the constraints of GAAP. Herein lies possibly 
the most important factor to consider in answering the question, is forensic accounting in the United States 
becoming a profession. Only CPAs are allowed to express an opinion regarding whether financial statements are 
presented fairly according to GAAP. However, to the extent that forensic accounting is not constrained by 
GAAP requirements, then the necessity of having a CPA license in the performance of forensic accounting is 
rendered superfluous. As noted by Fogarty and Parker (2010), public accounting has a statutory monopoly only 
over auditing. Public accounting has no monopoly power over non-auditing functions or services. The absence of 
monopoly power over non-auditing services opens the door for an entirely new profession to emerge separate 
and distinct from public accounting—forensic accounting. It thus remains only to determine whether forensic 
accounting fulfills a significant number of the criteria of a profession. 
 
CORPORATE FRAUD 
Accounting rules do not fully determine financial reporting practice, for reasons that include (Ball et al, 2000,): 
“practice is more detailed than standards; standards lag innovations in practice; and companies do not invariably 
implement standards.” Financial reporting practice is influenced by the uses to which financial reporting is put, 
by managers’ and auditors’ incentives, and institutional variables such as regulation and litigation risk. Thus, 
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firms actually do – not what they, their managers, their auditors or accounting standards say they do – is the 
more central issue in financial reporting. Objective, verifiable accounting information facilitates shareholder 
monitoring and the effective exercise of shareholder rights under existing securities laws; enables directors to 
enhance shareholder value by advising, ratifying, and policing managerial decisions and activities; and supplies a 
rich array of contractible variables for determining the financial rewards from incentive plans designed to align 
executives’ and investors’ financial interests (Bushman and Smith 2003). 
Ball (2001) is of the views that timely incorporation of economic losses in the published financial statements 
(that is, conservatism) increases the effectiveness of corporate governance, compensation systems, and debt 
agreements in motivating and monitoring managers. It decreases the ex ante likelihood that managers will 
undertake negative NPV projects but pass on their earnings consequences to a subsequent generation, and it 
increases the incentive of the current generation of managers to incur the personal cost of abandoning 
investments and strategies that have ex post negative Net Present Values. Financial accounting information 
contributes directly to economic performance by disciplining efficient management of assets in place (for 
example, timely abandonment of losing projects), better project selection, and reduced expropriation of 
investors’ wealth by the managers. 
For instance, improved governance can manifest in a reduction of the private benefits that managers can extract 
from the company or in a reduction of the legal and auditing costs that shareholders must bear to prevent 
managerial opportunism. These two changes can have opposite effects on the observed equilibrium stock returns, 
and the size of these effects depends on the degree of international segmentation of equity markets. 
Financial accounting information to enhance economic performance is by reducing adverse selection and 
liquidity risk. According to Amihud and Mendelson (2000), the liquidity of a company’s securities impacts the 
firm’s cost of capital. A major component of liquidity is adverse selection costs, which are reflected in the bid-
ask spread and market impact costs. Firms’ pre-commitment to the timely disclosure of high-quality financial 
accounting information reduces investors’ risk of loss from trading with more informed investors, thereby 
attracting more funds into the capital markets, lowering investors’ liquidity risk (see Diamond and Verrecchia 
1991; Botosan 2000; Brennan and Tamarowski 2000; and Leuz and Verrecchia 2000).  
It is the responsibility of management to put in place mechanism through which internal fraud can be minimize 
or totally eradicated from the system. A good internal control system will play a very significant role.  Internal 
fraud is fraud, waste and abuse that occur within the organization. This may involve employees, contract 
employees, or vendors. Examples of internal fraud are falsifying of figures, pilfery, stores lifting, working with 
vendors by signing an invoice of items not supplied, etc.  The potential for, or occurrence of, fraud and other 
illegal acts is a significant and sensitive management concern in any organization. This concern is heightened by 
the breadth and complexity of the responsibilities of this government, as well as the public expectation of 
honesty and integrity in individuals. This policy formalizes the process and responsibilities for deterring, 
detecting, reporting and investigating known, alleged or suspected fraud or other illegal acts in an organization.  
Hypotheses 
The framework for our tests can be understood by considering that there is a principal (i.e., the party for whom 
financial statements are prepared such as owners, creditors, regulators, suppliers, and the government) and two 
agents (the manager and the auditor). We observe the actions of these two agents – the manager’s demand for 
belonging audit firms belonging to their friends and the auditor’s make no effort – to understand the impact of 
ownership characteristics and family relationships on agency costs. For the purpose of this, we chose financial 
reporting, economic performance and cost of capital as control measures of corporate fraud. From the 
foregonigs, we hypothesize as follows:      
H1: There is a significant and positive association between forensic accounting and financial reporting. 
H2: There is a significant and positive association between forensic accounting and economic performance. 
H3: There is a significant and positive association between forensic accounting and cost of capital. 
  
METHODOLOGY 
To effectively carry out this study, a total of 1,500 middle and senior level organizational members of 
manufacturing firms based in the 2010 directory of the Port Harcourt zone of the manufacturers Association of 
Nigeria (MAN). From our pilot survey, it was discovered that a large of junior organizational members of 
manufacturing firms in Nigeria were casual workers. Also, a considerable number of this category of 
organizational members have very minimal formal education and may therefore find it difficult to comprehend 
the content of the of the research instrument. Since the study seeks to explain the effect of forensic accounting on 
corporate fraud, this group was not considered for the survey. Thus our population for the study was restricted to 
manufacturing firms in the organized private   sector to ease accessibility. For this reason, we adopted the 2011 
updated company directory of the Port Harcourt zone of the manufacturers’ Association of Nigeria (MAN), 
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which is the latest version available. The directory showed that fifty-five manufacturing firms were duly 
registered with the body (MAN).  
Sarantakos (2005) states that the use of tables is an easier way of estimating the right samples size from a given 
population. Consequently, in determining the sample size for this study, we adopted the Krejcie and Morgan 
(1970) table (Sarantakos, 2005; Sekaran 2003). The table according to Sarantakos (2005) computes the sample 
size by means of a formula developed by the research division of the National Education Association of the 
United States of America, ‘which takes into consideration chi-square for 1 degree of freedom, the population 
size, the population proportion, which is set at 0.05, and the degree of accuracy, which is set at 0.05“. The table 
has figures for population ranging from 10 to 1,000,000. The selection of the sample size only requires an 
accurate matching of the appropriate cell in the sample size column to the corresponding cell in the population 
column. Therefore, for our population of 1.500 middle and senior staff, corresponds to 306. For data we used 
questionnaire which was administered to our study sample.      
Association between Forensic Accounting and Corporate Fraud 
The result of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient for the association between forensic accounting and corporate 
fraud is presented in table 1 below. In addition to the correlation matrix obtained for the first research question, 
the table also gives the result of the statistical test of significance (p-value), which enables us to answer the 
question and generalize our finding to the population of the study. 
 
Table 1: Correlation Matrix for Forensic Accounting Measures and Corporate   
 Fraud  
         FA         FR          EP              CoC 
FA Pearson Correlation 1 423** 220** 440** 
 Sig. (1-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 
 N 235 235 235 235 
FR Pearson Correlation 423** 1 148* .578** 
 Sig. (1-tailed) .000 . 012 . 
 N 235 235 235 235 
EP Pearson Correlation .229** .148* 1 .428** 
 Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .012 . .000 
 N 235 235 235 235 
CoC Pearson Correlation .440** .576** .428** 1 
 Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .000 .000 . 
 N 235 235 235 235 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
Source:  Research Data 
Key: FA= Forensic Accounting 
        FR= Financial Reporting 
        ER= Economic Performance 
      CoC= Cost of Capital  
The result of the correlation in the table above shows that there is a significant and positive association between 
Forensic Accounting (FA), and Financial Reporting (FR) Economic Performance (EP) and Cost of Capital 
(CoC). Forensic Accounting is significantly and positively correlated to financial reporting (r = 0.423, p = 0.000 
< 0.01). Also, forensic accounting is significantly and positively correlated to organization’s economic 
performance (r = 0.229, p = 0.000 < 0.01). Finally, forensic accounting is significantly and positively correlated 
to cost of capital (r = 0.440, p = 0.000 < 0.01). The association that exists between forensic accounting and 
corporate fraud control measures is thus significant and positive at the 0.01 significance level and thus accept all 
our three hypotheses. 
 H1: There is a significant and positive association between forensic accounting and  financial reporting. 
 H2: There is a significant and positive association between forensic accounting and economic performance. 
H3: There is a significant and positive association between forensic accounting and cost of capital. 
The coefficient obtained for the first cluster of research hypotheses is shown in Tables 1.1 to 1.3 below. 
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Table 1.1: Regression analysis on the association between Forensic Accounting and Financial 
Reporting 
Model Summary 
Model R R 2     Adjusted R2  
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .423a .179 .175 .67365 





Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
1 Regression 22.997 1 22.997 50.677 .000a 
 Residual 105.736 233 .454   
 Total 126.733 234    
a. Predictors: (Constant), FORENSIC ACCOUNTING 







Coefficients   
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig 
1 (Constant) 1.658 .235  7.054 .000 
 FORENSIC 
ACCOUNTING 
.423 .059 .423 7.119 .000 
a. Predictors: Variable: FINANCIAL REPORTING 
Source:  Research Data 
 
Table 1.2: Regression analysis on the Association between Forensic Accounting and Economic 
Performance 
Model Summary 
Model R R2        Adjusted R2  
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .229a .052 .048 .65461 




Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
1 Regression 5.510 1 5.510 12.859 .000a 
 Residual 99.843 233 .429   
 Total 105.353 234    
a. Predictors: (Constant), FORENSIC ACCOUNTING  






Coefficients   
Model          B    Std. Error                Beta        t Sig 
1 (Constant) 2.115 .228  .9.259 .000 
 FORENSIC 
ACCOUNTING 
.207 .08 .229 3.586 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Source:  Research Data 
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Table 1.3: Regression analysis on the Association between Forensic Accounting and Cost of Capital 
Model Summary 
Model                                 R R2        Adjusted R2               
   Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .440a .193 .190 .64492 




Squares          df    Mean Square F Sig 
1 Regression 23.231 1 23.231 55.855 .000a 
 Residual 96.909 233 .416   
 Total 120.140 234    
a. Predictors: (Constant), FORENSIC ACCOUNTING  






Coefficients   
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig 
1 (Constant) 1.477 .225  .6.565 .000 
 FORENSIC 
ACCOUNTING 
.426 .057 .440 7.474 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: COST OF CAPITAL  
Source:  Research Data 
 
DISCUSSING OF FINDINGS 
The coefficient r for hypothesis 1 is 0.423 significant at 0.01 level; that for hypothesis 2 is 0.229; while that of 
hypothesis 3 is 0.440. Basing our decision on  (Irving 2005:16) benchmark, we thus accept H1, H2 and H3, that 
there is a significantly positive association between forensic accounting and financial reporting, economic 
performance and cost of capital.  
The rate of corporate fraud is on the increase and evidence abound that most financial reports are not properly 
stated. Accounting information system is an integral part of an organization’s control system and thus provides 
critical decision-influencing and decision-facilitating information for control (e.g., Baiman 1982; Birnberg et al. 
1983; Merchant 1985a; Tiessen and Waterhouse 1983). Corporate fraud is becoming very rampant in Africa. Our 
study reveals that most high level managers do not want to work for too long rather would prefer to work for a 
short whole and become owners.  
The study further revealed that the supplying firms are owned by these managers thereby ignoring the much 
pronounced ‘due process’. In some cases, there is no internal control unit and where one exists, the staff are 
relations of the managers or under the supervision of the managers. Management decides what to include in the 
financial report.      
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION  
Neoclassical economics and several management theories assume that the corporation’s objective is profit 
maximization subject to capacity constraints. The central focus is shareholders as the ultimate residual claimant, 
providing the necessary financial capital for the firm’s operations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Zingales, 2000). 
Most managers think more of themselves thereby thinking of loopholes to enrich themselves. Universities all 
over the world should run a forensic accounting degree so as to create more awareness of what it entails. Costs of 
capital are always influenced by management. GAAP and IFRS are not adhered to by financial reporting 
accountants.  Based on the foregoing we make the following recommendations: 
1. In the case of Nigeria the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and other related bodies 
as it applies to other countries should be allowed free   hand without government intervention. 
2. All culprits should be tried publicly. 
3. All cash or fixed assets confiscated from the culprit should be made known and publish in the internet 
for world consumption. 
4. The individual should not be allowed asylum in any country.  
5. All accomplishers should suffer the same fate as the principal actor. 
6. The accomplisher and the culprit should be made to suffer the same fate. 
7. Finally, financial reporting accountants should work independent of management.    
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